



## IT'S THAT TIME OF YEAR AGAIN!

**Canadian Immigration Historical Society 2011 Annual General Meeting  
Thursday October 20, 2011 6:00PM**

The AGM will be held again this year at St Anthony Soccer Club, 523 St Anthony Street, Ottawa. St Anthony Street runs off Preston Street immediately north of the 417 overpass. There is plenty of free parking and wheelchair access.

We anticipate a stellar guest speaker this year.

We have to charge for drinks and we ask members who are in a position to do so to make a \$25.00 per person contribution for the excellent Italian Buffet the Club provides.

Spouses and guests are most welcome.

RSVP [rgirard09@gmail.com](mailto:rgirard09@gmail.com) or call Mike at 613 241 0166

\*\*\*\*\*

## Stage B: Canadian Immigration Security Screening, 1946-1952

*Kurt F. Jensen*

Immigrants to Canada during the early part of the twentieth century were subject to exclusion for many reasons, including race, religion, criminality and ideological views.

Selection of immigrants was largely discretionary, although immigration officers received guidance on who should be accepted. Of the many reasons for refusing admission, protection of the realm did not figure largely in the criteria during the early years and probably had little impact for Canada before the postwar period. Protection of national security was not an explicit immigration selection criterion, although the *Immigration Act 1923* did contain a series of excluded persons, comprising those who advocated the violent overthrow of governments, spies, treasonous persons, as well as various criminal and medical categories.<sup>1</sup> Communists and socialists were also excluded but only when identified as such.<sup>2</sup> Most immigrants to Canada during the early part of the twentieth century were uncomplicated people, often agriculturalist with little

formal education and with little cause for posing security concerns.

While statutory exclusion categories existed, it is the recollection of Maurice Mitchell, a renowned immigration officer who, as a child, often accompanied his father to his office when the latter was a Canadian immigration officer in Danzig in the 1920s, that immigration examinations were minimal and never focused on security issues.<sup>3</sup>

All this changed with the establishment of the Security Panel by the Canadian government on June 24, 1946. The defection of Igor Gouzenko, a Russian cipher clerk, who revealed extensive Soviet espionage in Canada and allied nations, changed the attitude towards security matters. The decision to establish the Security Panel was taken at a Cabinet meeting on May 17, which accorded it an advisory role and placed it under the auspices of the Privy Council Office.<sup>4</sup>

The Security Panel consisted of representatives of the three military services, External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs), the RCMP and the Defence Research Board, under the chairmanship of the Privy Council. Other departments could attend when matters affecting them were discussed. The template for the Security Panel was a modified version of what was used by the United Kingdom.

One of the first initiatives to be looked at by the Security Panel was security screening. The security screening established by the Security Panel fell into two categories: vetting of public servants and screening of persons seeking admission to Canada.<sup>5</sup> Among the questions confronting the Panel at its inaugural meeting was that of "passport control," meaning the security screening of applicants for immigration to Canada.<sup>6</sup> This initiative sought to impose objective procedures for identifying persons who could pose a threat to Canada, rather than relying on intuitive assessments by overworked immigration officers untrained for this purpose.

Although the Security Panel was established in the context of the emerging Cold War, security vetting of immigrants was initially directed at prohibiting the entry of persons with a "subversive background," particularly those with past "membership in Fascist, Nazi or similar organizations."<sup>7</sup>

The Security Panel recommended to Cabinet in the fall of 1946 that amendments to the Immigration Act include authority for enhanced security screening of immigrants. A specific provision was sought whereby the Minister (for immigration) could, by certificate, accept or reject anyone on security grounds. A public highlighting of the security screening requirement in proposed new immigration legislation, however, was perceived as a complication to the passage of the legislation.<sup>8</sup> At this stage, security screening seems to have been envisaged as being conducted by immigration officers. Cabinet rejected the proposed legislative recommendation with instructions to solve the matter "by other means,"<sup>9</sup> suggesting discomfort with the articulation of full details of immigration selection criteria and with security vetting falling to the responsibility of immigration officers.

The Immigration Act of the time, in Section 38, prohibited the admission of defined categories of immigrants in broad terms, but no instrument existed in 1946 for determining conclusively

whether a person was a member of a prohibited class. Decisions could be arbitrary and subjective and relied exclusively on departmental administrative action.

Immigration selection officers had no training in determining what might constitute grounds for exclusion on national security grounds. Nor were instruments in place for learning of such matters. The Department of Mines and Resources, which was responsible for immigration matters and already overworked, had no resources with which to assume responsibility for new immigration selection criteria. Thought was given by the Security Panel to have British "Passport Control" (i.e., the British Secret Intelligence Service – SIS) assume the task, if willing, on a temporary basis, although the Security Panel made a recommendation on August 19 that a permanent solution should require involvement of the RCMP in security examinations.<sup>10</sup>

The first RCMP Security Service member assigned to Visa Control duties was sent to London on October 25, 1946. The officer was Staff Sergeant W.W. Hinton, whose responsibility was to check names provided by the Immigration Branch in Ottawa with the SIS and British Special Branch and any other resources which became available. Names were to be marked "not clear for security" or "clear for security," as appropriate, following record checks. The factors rendering a person undesirable would be provided to Hinton through "verbal instructions."<sup>11</sup> This is significant and clearly shows unease with the manner in which security checking would be imposed. Although the RCMP Security Service assumed vetting responsibility, it is clear that their contribution rested largely with querying British records, having no real intelligence resources of their own with which to make a contribution.

The overseas security screening by RCMP Security Service officers operated as "Visa Control Officers." This was an allusion to the well-known (and no longer used) cover of "Passport Control Officers" employed by the British Secret Intelligence Service during the interwar period. The security screening activity was code-named Stage B, with the proper immigration procedure presumably being Stage A, although not referred to as such in documents.

Problems were apparent immediately. While tens of thousands of persons were applying and being

approved for immigration, the RCMP estimated that they could only provide security screening for about 5,000 people per year.<sup>12</sup> Apart from inadequate staffing, a further complication was that British liaison offices used by the RCMP to conduct security screening, could only handle from 25-30 checks per day, with a backlog of cases rapidly mounting.<sup>13</sup> With no realistic way in which to resolve the conundrum, a modification to the screening process was introduced whereby the existing backlog for Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Greece was eliminated entirely; future screening was focused almost exclusively on inhabitants of former enemy-occupied territory.<sup>14</sup> Whether focus on the former enemy and its allies reflected real concerns with the acceptance of potential war criminals for immigration, or whether this was an acknowledgment of the reality that captured enemy documentation made this virtually the only category of applicants who could be confidently vetted, is unknown.

By early 1947, with immigration selection teams on the ground in Europe, it was recognized that the proposed "abandonment of security examination of prospective immigrants could not be recommended." This resulted in a recommendation by the Security Panel to Cabinet to limit screening to persons "originating in the countries of Eastern Europe."<sup>15</sup> This was rejected with the direction that "security screening ... be required only [where] ... information available to Immigration authorities needed to be supplemented by special security investigations."<sup>16</sup>

This was rejected by Cabinet, which had no solution to the quandary, but which placed the responsibility for security screening on the shoulders of overworked immigration officers without addressing their existing inability to properly perform security screening with existing resources.

Some acknowledgment of the growing problem was made when RCMP resources dedicated to overseas security screening were expanded during this period; by early 1947, they consisted of two officers in London, seven in Germany, one in The Hague and one in Italy. From the beginning of the programme up to November 1, 1946, the RCMP had reviewed 33,538 cases, of which 389 had been rejected and 9,311 remained in a backlog. However, within months of receiving augmented resources, it had already been determined that a

small number of postwar immigrants who had reached Canada had Nazi connections, ties to Soviet intelligence or were connected to organized people smugglers.<sup>17</sup> Clearly, the vetting process was not foolproof.

The effectiveness and the qualifications of the RCMP officers carrying out security screening of immigration applicants at this time are questionable. The RCMP recognized that their organization did not maintain an intelligence or counter-intelligence organization in Europe and limited their security checks (apart from what might be disclosed by an allied agency) to an individual's avowed sympathies and actions during the war and to whether sympathies for communism or subversive influences were expressed.<sup>18</sup> A perception existed among the immigration officers that the security checks were superficial and identified few problem cases, something which the RCMP contested. Many of the details of the specific exchange remain classified and conclusions cannot be reached with great certainty.<sup>19</sup>

Not contributing to a positive view of the early security vetting process among immigration officers was likely the knowledge that some early Stage B officers were not members of the RCMP. Although the senior security officers overseas were full RCMP members, a number of others had been recruited in England from among former intelligence or police organizations (whether they were Canadian is questionable) solely for the visa-vetting work, and not as permanent members of the RCMP. The contribution of the overseas-recruited security-vetting officers was rated as "...not been entirely satisfactory" and many were replaced by others (possibly also recruited in England).<sup>20</sup> To assign responsibility for an important national security task to foreign contract employees reflects the unprofessional manner in which early Canadian immigration security vetting was conducted.

By 1947, a regime was in place for forwarding copies of Form 55, the immigration application, from applicants in Europe (not elsewhere in the world) to RCMP headquarters for security vetting.<sup>21</sup> Specific security clearance was required of all applicants in Russia, Germany, Austria and Italy, as well as everyone of enemy nationality (but not wives and minor children) wherever they applied.<sup>22</sup> The RCMP would only conduct a record check of those others who did not fall within the narrow class of high target applicants.

Beginning in 1947, immigration selection teams focused on family reunification cases and visited occupied Germany and Austria to select persons identified by the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) as possible candidates. An RCMP Security Service officer, recently arrived in London, was dispatched with the first team.<sup>23</sup>

The size of the immigration movement from Germany, Austria, and Italy quickly exceeded expectations. Halfway through the year it was recorded that two small immigration teams of one immigration officer, one medical doctor, and one RCMP officer each, were faced with about 17,000 applicants in a bulk labour movement (farm workers, woodworkers, garment workers, domestics, etc.), some 16,000 close relatives applying to immigrate and smaller numbers of others, such as Sudeten Germans, spouses of Canadian servicemen and so forth, who did not fall within the established movements but who also had to be accommodated.<sup>24</sup>

The immigration demands outstripped the resources of the initial two immigration teams of 6 people. By August authority was sought to establish a permanent regional immigration mission in Heidelberg (American Zone), which was centrally located and had good infrastructure, including a staff of 50 (plus some Canadian interpreters) and a motor pool of eight vehicles.<sup>25</sup>

Strains remained evident between the immigration officers and the RCMP in 1948. These reflected the haste with which the postwar immigration movement had been launched and the misunderstandings which naturally emerge in new enterprises where unforeseen difficulties arise. Much of the concern was slowly resolved through an exchange of letters on the duties and responsibilities of security officers.<sup>26</sup>

By the fall of 1948, further clarity of the grounds for rejections of applications on security grounds was evident. The reasons for rejection included communist sympathies, various categories of Nazis, criminals, gamblers, prostitutes, etc. In addition, there were several categories relating to evasiveness under interrogation and use of false names or documents.<sup>27</sup> Problems rested with the "Nazi" category, which was extensive, covering membership in the party and action in various armed services, collaboration with the Germans and so forth. Initial rigorous "Nazi" criteria slowly

loosened as understanding grew of the complexity of the Nazi machine. For example, by 1948, service with the German army by persons who were citizens of occupied countries was relaxed if the service was "rendered under physical compulsion."<sup>28</sup>

Intriguingly, an internal RCMP document included the following among the standard rejection criteria: "(j) After careful interrogation and deliberation [an applicant] is considered not a fit and proper person to be granted entry into Canada. This covering evidence received (in Germany) to the effect that Applicant was disinclined or unwilling to work, and generally lazy."<sup>29</sup> It cannot be determined whether this was an internal RCMP direction or an early drafting effort which wiser heads quickly deleted. The criterion is not recorded elsewhere among grounds for rejection, and had nothing to do with national security.

While remaining problems with security screening of displaced persons in Germany, Austria, and Italy were slowly being addressed, it was apparent that the manner of handling all others was addressed in inconsistent and potentially problematic ways. All Soviet Bloc applicants and Israelis would only be processed if applying at one of the immigration offices in Western Europe. Chinese applicants, with the exception of some exempt from security screening, would not be processed at all. All applicants from Latin America, other than native born nationals, would also be subject to security screening to forestall inadmissible European applicants seeking entry by way of South America.<sup>30</sup>

Applicants, other than the foregoing, followed a "14-day plan." After all other selection criteria were met, application forms were forwarded to the RCMP, which had 14 days in which to raise any security concerns. This system collapsed almost immediately. The RCMP relied heavily on British intelligence services which, by now, could process approximately 35 cases per day with a backlog already listing 13,365 cases by March 1949.<sup>31</sup> The RCMP security-vetting programme was slowly sinking under the unforeseen volume of cases and its virtually sole reliance on British intelligence services.

Immigration to Canada was always heavily politicized. This reflected the family reunification efforts which governed the movement's early

postwar period and the natural efforts of ethnic communities to help their compatriots. Complaints to elected officials often followed a refusal. Although the number of rejections on grounds of security was always small, all such cases caused greater political problems than other refusals because of the sensitive nature of the cause for rejection. To forestall the pressure placed on the government to explain or justify security rejections, the Cabinet decided in September 1949 that rejections of applicants for immigration were under no circumstances to be attributed to security grounds.<sup>32</sup>

By 1950, the vetting system was again revised. British, Irish, French, Americans, native-born Latin Americans, South Africans and aliens with status in the USA were made exempt from security screening. Exemptions were also ordered for the elderly, wives, young children and ordained ministers of religion.<sup>33</sup> A decision was taken, due to a desire for increased immigration, to end nominal membership in the Nazi Party as a criterion for rejection on security grounds. Germans who had returned to Germany from Canada shortly before the outbreak of the war, however, remained admissible only after referral to Ottawa for a decision.<sup>34</sup>

Although the criteria for rejection on security grounds relied almost exclusively on membership in a prohibited category, it was evident by the late 1940s that the criteria were not applied in a consistent manner. One problem was the imprecise articulation of prohibited categories provided by the RCMP to its screening officers. For example, "(k) collaborators presently residing in previously occupied territory" was interpreted by some RCMP officers as not including collaborators who were displaced persons who were in Germany (not an occupied country).<sup>35</sup> Similarly, no standardized series of questions was used resulting in the line of questioning often falling "within the discretion of an individual screening development."<sup>36</sup> This was a clear weakness, allowing some individuals to pass security screening if not being asked the proper questions.

The Cold War also contributed to the manner of security screening. While security screening was focused on identifying Communist, Nazi/Fascists/Collaborators and various categories of criminals, there is evidence that by the later 1940s and early 1950s, the Stage B officers of the

RCMP were more concerned with "apprehending communists than individuals thought to have collaborated with the enemy during the war."<sup>37</sup> This attitude had an immediate application for all East Europeans, particularly those who might have cooperated with the Germans during the war.

The most critical development, however, was the growing magnitude of the immigration movement. The Canadian government issued an Order-in-Council (P.C. 2856) in 1949 aimed at stimulating further immigration. From November 1949 to the following year, there was an 8% increase in applications. However, from December, 1949, to the following year, the increase was a significant growth of 36.7%, and the numbers were expected to continue to grow.<sup>38</sup>

Events were moving towards a crisis. The RCMP Stage B operation simply could not handle the existing workload or the anticipated coming wave of immigration applications. Clearances through British security sources were pegged at 35 per day. By early 1951, a backlog of seven weeks existed for British checks with many taking even longer. The existing method of relying heavily on British and other Western security services for backgrounds on immigration applicants was not viable. Nor was an increase in dedicated RCMP Security Service resources viewed as a solution since such would merely allow the backlogs awaiting checks with allied services to grow.<sup>39</sup>

Immigration authorities proposed a radical rethinking of the security vetting of immigration applicants. Of the 220,000 immigrants requiring security screening, since the Stage B procedures had been implemented in 1946, only 4,146 had been rejected, and many of those had failed their security screening in the early postwar years when service in the German Army, in any capacity, was grounds for rejection.<sup>40</sup> The implication, left unsaid, was that using the rejection criteria which existed by 1950, the security rejection rate was likely to be substantially less than 1% of applicants, hardly a valid reason for delaying for months the movement of people to Canada for humanitarian and economic reasons.

By 1952 it had become clear that the security screening process was inconsistent, imprecise and largely administered by individuals with limited training and preparation for the complexities facing them. The guidelines setting out the grounds for



security refusals, which had been issued by the RCMP, did not contain sufficient clarity and detail of interpretation to permit consistent application.

Nevertheless, by the early 1950s some sophistication in Canada's handling of security matters was becoming evident. An important contributing factor was the recruitment of Peter Dwyer, who had been the second-ranking officer of the British Security Coordination office in New York during the war and the British intelligence liaison officer in Washington in the years which followed. Dwyer had retired from the British Secret Intelligence Service and come to Canada in 1952, where he worked in the Privy Council Office on security matters.<sup>41</sup> One of his early responsibilities was to assume direction of the Security Panel and to draft directives and instructions for handling security matters, in which he sought to achieve greater precision in interpretation.

Dwyer sent a memorandum to the Security Panel in April, 1952, proposing a refining of the rejection criteria for Germans and those who assisted the Germans. He advised against blanket rejections based on memberships in various organizations or for collaboration, in favour of judgments based on a more nuanced understanding of the facts. While noting the RCMP Security Service's desire for the exclusion of anyone who had collaborated with the enemy, Dwyer recommended that consideration be given to the pressure exerted on individuals to force collaboration.<sup>42</sup> Implicit in Dwyer's proposal was a "statute of limitations" for persons who had not been convicted of any war crime (and who were not being sought).<sup>43</sup> While the recommendations were not accepted in their entirety, Dwyer and his efforts had a positive impact on the Security Service of the RCMP.

The Stage B security vetting of immigrants in its formative years, from its commencement in 1946 until the arrival of Peter Dwyer at the Security Panel in 1952, was not significantly successful. The rejection rate of immigrant applicants was less than 1%, when ordinary German Wehrmacht soldiers were excluded. Some of the remainder were also caught up in the early blanket exclusion of any form of collaborators, regardless of the circumstances.

The focus of the RCMP Security Service investigations was on the easy targets. These included people recorded in the meticulously maintained captured German records of all who

had served the Nazi regime or supported or collaborated with it. To this was added the known communists, communist-sympathizers and Trotskyites known to Western security agencies.

The focus of the Stage B security vetting was directed at Nazi and Nazi-sympathizers, rather than communists.<sup>44</sup> Howard Margolian, who wrote the seminal study on Nazi immigration to Canada, estimates that 2,000 Nazi war criminals and collaborators entered Canada in the 1946-1956 period, despite the existing security screening procedures.<sup>45</sup> There are no numbers available on how many communists of various shadings were stopped by the security-screening process but the likelihood is that only a small number were identified. Actual Soviet agents were probably not identified because they did not match the RCMP operational profile, which relied primarily on existing records to identify prohibited persons -- records which were unlikely to contain the names of clandestine Soviet agents (some Soviet agents are known to have reached Canada).

The effectiveness of the early security screening is questionable. Some who were clearly inadmissible were prevented from gaining entry while others experienced little difficulty. The vetting process relied on checking existing records held by allied security services, which were unlikely to be comprehensive. The RCMP Security Service did not demonstrate the skills and insight required to interdict anyone posing a threat to Canadian national security who was not already on an allied list or did not self-identify as a threat.

A clear failing of the process was that security screening interviews took only a few moments, hardly enough to accomplish much beyond verifying data, and hardly sufficient to determine the veracity of an individual's story.<sup>46</sup>

The failings of the security screening process reflect the speed with which it was created, the burgeoning size of the immigration movement, the absence at the senior bureaucratic and political levels of a clear understanding of the challenge and the seeming unpreparedness of the RCMP in terms of resources, understanding of the problem and training for the task.

A greater failing, with longer-term implications, was the inability of the RCMP Security Service to conduct independent Canadian assessments of the

threat to the nation. The vetting process in the early years relied almost exclusively on the existing files of the British security authorities and captured German documentation. One perceives the vetting process as conducted by individuals unsuitable and little prepared for the work, and who relied too much on the contents of files prepared by other nations.

The security vetting problems did not disappear with the arrival at the Security Panel of Peter Dwyer, but his arrival did bring a greater understanding of the challenge, and knowledge of what might be done to address it. In the years which followed, the performance of the RCMP Security Service likely improved as training and greater experience with security vetting had their impact. By 1959, the European establishment of RCMP Stage B officers, in 14 countries, totalled

one officer and 32 regular members, plus support staff.<sup>47</sup>

The early Stage B process reflected the weakness of a policy hastily conceived, poorly resourced, with an absence of clear directives. What was put in place had no solid national intelligence foundation to work from and only a poorly articulated concept of the national security threat. Few Soviet and East Bloc intelligence agents were likely to have been impeded, unless they were well known to British or allied intelligence services. Security interviews, lasting only minutes and conducted by ill-prepared officers, were unlikely to unearth anything not already included in cursory files. Security screening was, and remains, important. The early postwar effort, however, is not likely to have met the needs of the task.

<sup>1</sup>Email. Gerry Van Kessel/Canadian Immigration Historical Society (CIHS), 18 March 2011.

<sup>2</sup>[www.mapleleafweb.com/features/immigration-policy-canada-history-administration-and-debates](http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/immigration-policy-canada-history-administration-and-debates) (Cited 7 March 2011).

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 2/18. Vol. 65. File C-20-5. Security Panel, 17 May 1946.

<sup>5</sup>Carl Betke and S.W. Horrall, *Canada's Security Service: An Historical Outline, 1864-1966*. Vol 2. R.C.M.P. (Ottawa: Historical Section, 1978. ATIP redacted version) p. 582.

<sup>6</sup>LAC, RG 2/18. Vol. 251. File 5-100-M. Security Panel, 24 June 1946.

<sup>7</sup>Gunn Files. Vitols Folder. Wood, RCMP, to St. Laurent, Minister of Justice, 9 October 1946 (The Gunn Files are repositied with the Canadian Immigration Historical Society).

<sup>8</sup>Gunn Files. Csatory Folder. Nicholson, RCMP, to DCI re Visa Control. 23 July 1946.

<sup>9</sup>Gunn Files. Vitols Folder. Wood, RCMP, to St. Laurent, Minister of Justice, 9 October 1946 (The Gunn Files are repositied with the Canadian Immigration Historical Society).

<sup>10</sup>LAC. RG 2/18. Vol. 251. File 5-100-M. Security Panel, 8 July 1946, and Security Panel, 19 August, 1946; and File 5-100-D. Memorandum for the Security Panel, 30 March 1948.

<sup>12</sup>Carl Betke and S.W. Horrall, *Canada's Security Service: An Historical Outline, 1864-1966*. Vol 2. R.C.M.P. (Ottawa: Historical Section, 1978. ATIP redacted version) p. 584.

<sup>13</sup>LAC. RG 2/18. Vol. 251. File 5-100-D. Memorandum for the Security Panel, 30 March 1948.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>LAC RG 26. Vol. 164. File 3-18-17(1). Wood/RCMP to Keenleyside/Immigration Branch. 10 May 1948.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>LAC RG 26. Vol. 164. File 3-18-17(1). Wood/RCMP to Keenleyside/Immigration Branch. 10 May 1948.

<sup>21</sup>LAC. RG 76. Vol. 821. File 552-1-545. Procedure in Handling Alien Immigration. 15 April 1947.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>LAC. RG 25. Vol.2113. File AR 408/40 pt. 1. HK to Travel Control Section, Control Commission for Germany and Austria. 15 January 1947.

<sup>24</sup>LAC. RG 26. Vol. 121. File 3-32-2. Memorandum to the Cabinet, 8 August 1947.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>LAC. RG 76. Vol. 800. File 547-1 pt. 1. Wood/RCMP to Jolliffe/Immigration Branch. 8 July 1948.

<sup>27</sup>Gunn Files. Vitols Folder. Screening of Applicants for Admission to Canada. 20 November 1948.

<sup>28</sup>Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration vs. Peteris Arvids Vitols. Docket T-310-97, 1998/09/23, p. 25.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid. Major Wright to Commissioner/RCMP. 11 August 1948

<sup>30</sup>Gunn Files. Csatory Folder.

Gaskell/Security Panel to MacNeil/RCMP, with attachments. 30 September 1949.

<sup>31</sup>LAC. RG 2/18. Vol. 251. File 5-100-D. Security Screening of Immigrants: Present Problems. 29 March 1949.

<sup>32</sup>LAC. RG 76. Vol. 947. File SF-C-1 pt. 1. Rejection of Immigrants on Security Grounds. 28 October 1949.

<sup>33</sup>LAC. RG 76. Vol. 800. File. 547-1 pt. 1. Security Screening. 14 February 1950

<sup>34</sup>Gunn Files. Vitols Folder. MacNeil/RCMP to Wright. RCMP/London. 4 December 1950.

<sup>35</sup>Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration vs. Peteris Arvids Vitols. Docket T-310-97, 1998/09/23, pp. 65-67.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>38</sup>Gunn Files. Vitols Folder. Security Screening. 7 February 1951.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War* (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1993), p. 307.

<sup>42</sup>LAC. RG2, 18. Vol. 232. File S-100-1-D. Immigration Security Policy – Nazis, Fascists and Collaborators. 30 April 1952.

<sup>43</sup>LAC. RG 2, 18. Vol. 232. File S-100-1-M. Security Panel. 15 May 1952.

<sup>44</sup>Howard Margolian. *Unauthorized Entry The Truth About Nazi War Criminals in Canada, 1946-1956*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), p. 36.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>46</sup>Federal Court of Canada. Docket T-310-97, dated 19980923. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration vs. Peteris (Peter) Arvids Vitols, p. 59.

<sup>47</sup>Carl Betke and S.W. Horrall, *Canada's Security Service: An Historical Outline, 1864-1966*. Vol 2. R.C.M.P. (Ottawa: Historical Section, 1978. ATIP redacted version) p. 698.

## Letter to the Editor *from Lynda Joyce*

I am pleased to report that my article, "A Silent History: the British Home Children" (Bulletin 59, September, 2010) was published in the 2011 Heritage Book of the Federation of Danish Associations in Canada. It seems to be the only non-Danish article!!

Brian Le Conte and I have exchanged information about his ongoing investigation of his Home Child grandfather, so I was pleased to see that he made a contribution to the recent newsletter, complete with a photo.

AND, best news of all, my sister has finished her book, "The Street Arab: the story of a British Home Child" which will be printed in time for the first ever celebration of British Home Child Day in Ontario on September 28th!

September 28<sup>th</sup> has been proclaimed as the Day of the Home Child in Ontario in a bill introduced by MPP Jim Brownell who also wrote the Foreword for my sister's book. His mother was a Home Child whom we met on the trip to Scotland organized by Quarriers. I understand that a full-day event will be planned for Upper Canada village on that day. My sister, Sandra Joyce, has been invited to launch her book at that event !!

Anyone who is interested in knowing more and possibly attending the September 28<sup>th</sup> celebration or in learning more (or even better) ordering a copy of my sister's book should drop me an email at [lyndaj797@gmail.com](mailto:lyndaj797@gmail.com). Thanks!

**Editor's note:** Congratulations to both Lynda and Sandra.

## The Canadian Immigration Act, an exploration of the policy process

— an invitation from Professor Ravi Pendakur

As is the case for many settler societies, Canada has experienced substantial demographic and social change over the past few decades. Some of the most dramatic shifts have been as a result of immigration intakes which have literally transformed our major cities into global microcosms. These changes did not take place in a vacuum. Rather, this remarkable cultural shift has been the result of conscious decisions regarding whom Canada has been willing to accept into the fold, and under what conditions.

I am interested in understanding how our immigration policies came to be. The goal of this project is to explore and understand both the policy decision-making process and the role and the views of the bureaucratic and political actors involved. The intent is to put faces to the policy process and look at the impact of policy decisions which resulted in the changes to Canada's immigration policy. In particular I am interested in the processes that resulted in the 1976 Immigration Act and the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. These Acts were transformative, changing both people's perceptions of immigration and the roles that immigrants were to play in Canada. They were also complex and deliberate

processes, each taking in excess of five years before being passed.

In order to understand this process I wish to speak to former immigration officers who were involved in developing changes to the Acts and Regulations. Interviews will focus on illuminating the rationales for decisions, challenges in the processes and the way in which decisions were made with regard to policy formulation. In particular, I wish to understand where the turning points were, what the obstacles were to proceeding, and why a particular approach was taken.

Given the mandate of the Canadian Immigration Historical Society, I have spoken to Mike Molloy about working with CIHS to develop this project and identify key people who would be willing to speak to me about their role in defining immigration policy. I will be contacting specific people as part of this project and am more than willing to speak to anyone else who may be interested in talking about their role in the policy process.

Ravi Pendakur, Professor  
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs  
University of Ottawa, 11122 Desmarais Hall  
55 Laurier Avenue East, Ottawa, Ontario K1S 2H5  
Phone: 613-562-5800 ext 4162  
Email: [Pendakur@uottawa.ca](mailto:Pendakur@uottawa.ca)



## 1972: A Year in the Life of an Immigration Officer - a Memoir by Gary John Komar

**Editor's note:** In recent years we published an account of Gary Komar's post-retirement assignment in the United Arab Emirates (Bulletins 51 to 53) and even earlier (Bulletins 39 and 40) we carried accounts of his early years in the Department under the title: "One Fabulous Career." The memoir provides a unique, unexpurgated picture of the day-to-day life of an immigration employee, and a veritable catalogue of Immigration employees of the day. Gary continues to send us chapters from his fabulous career, most recently an interesting account of his experiences in 1972. Gary has had some health problems in the last year and we wish him a speedy recovery.

### January 1972:

After a few months supervising the Independent Immigrant unit as an A/PM4 in the summer of 1971, I returned as a PM 3 to Frank Murphy's Non-Immigrant Entries Unit, Admissions Division, Home Services Branch (HSB). Frank, Ernie White, Larry Gafenco and Gus Leonard occupied nearby offices. In November 1971, I applied for a position as an Appeals Officer (PM4).

Bryce Mackasey became Minister of Manpower and Immigration in January, 1972, in Pierre Trudeau's Liberal Government, replacing Otto Lang.

**January 10, 1972:** At a meeting of our Union local Al Gunn of our National Office spoke on the upcoming 1972 PSAC Convention. My one-year term as President of the local expired at the end of January with Lionel Dixon succeeding me. I continued as part of the Branch Executive and a Delegate to the 1972 PSAC National Convention. Later in 1972 Lionel Dixon became M&I Union national president and Betty Roff took over as President of the local.

A sample of issues addressed by Frank Murphy's Non Immigrant Entries Unit:

- **January 31, 1972:** representations by the Governor of St. Vincent on behalf of one of his citizens who was not granted an employment authorization as the wife of a CIDA student in Canada. The Canada Manpower Center could not provide employment clearance as a considerable

number of unemployed Canadians were available for the vacancy.

- **February 11, 1972:** U.S. Congressman made representations on behalf of four men who refused to answer the questions of a Customs Officer at Pigeon River, Ontario. A Special Inquiry Officer traveled from Thunder Bay to issue Deportation Orders to these non bona-fides visitors. The men had not been truthful in relating the incident to the Congressman. One of the men "spoke of his right to come to Canada".

- **March 9, 1972:** One Non-Immigrant Applicant for Landing (NIAL) was refused on Personal Assessment points by one field office for having "bad breath." The reassessment at IDHQ found the person should have received a total of 50 points and been accepted. Needless to say, given the person's right of appeal to the Immigration Appeal Board, the negative decision was quickly overturned.

**February 22-24, 1972:** IDHQ held the fourth Annual Immigration Admissions Conference in Ottawa. Dalt Collins, Chief, Admissions Division, chaired the conference and 22 guests from IDHQ attended including John McKenna, Director, HSB. The Immigration Attaché at the U.S. Embassy, C. Wood, and C. Johnston of USINS North Eastern HQ in Burlington, Vermont, gave an audio-visual presentation on fraudulent passports and visas. S. Juvet of CIDA discussed foreign aid to students while John Manion, Director, Manpower Training Branch provided an account of the Manpower training programmes. Ray Corbett, Director of Immigration Operations in Winnipeg led a discussion on the use of discretion. Cliff Shaw, former Visa Attaché in New Delhi, reviewed problems in India.

During the Admissions Conference, I attended an Introduction to Management Course in Kemptville, Ontario. After the course, Art Lepitre, Home Services Branch Coordinator and Executive Assistant, requested a report from those who attended the course, asking how the "training given will be of benefit in the performance" of an officer's duties. In response, my report on the course noted: "In all honesty, I cannot relate entirely the training taken at the course to my present duties without

providing criticism of my superiors who control the performance of my written duties. In my opinion and in the opinion of many of the students who attended, the restrictions imposed by our respective management stifle the practical implementation of much of the material given at the course, even though in many areas practical application is possible even on a limited or experimental basis." I went on to review how the modern management theories presented at the course were impractical for implementation in a politically-driven public service environment. During the course, Mr. Dick Arima, A Toronto consultant taking his Ph.D. in Boston, outlined his theory on social organization including motivational forces, communication processes, interaction, decision-making, goal-setting, control processes, and performance of group and individuals, highlighting the forces at work opposing change, and the methods of overcoming obstacles to change. "What [Arima's presentation] did for many of us was to provide some workable formulae whereby in our own jobs we might be effective in lessening or overcoming resistance to change and in instituting change to encourage the communication and motivational aspects covered in the past two weeks." Arima stressed that a manager must not only have technical competence, but must have what he termed "personhood," the ability to respond to one's own capacity, feelings and will, or, interjecting ourselves as persons into our roles as managers. I completed my report by saying: "The value of this course can only be determined by the results of the application of some its concepts in relation to my duties."

**February 1972:** The new executive of the union's M&I local:

Lionel Dixon, Branch President; Betty Roff, Vice President; Harry Donner, Treasurer; Members at Large: Fern Corriveau, Gary Komar, and Tom Mascaro. All members of the executive were delegates to PSAC's Triennial Convention held in Ottawa, June 1-3, 1972.

**March 8, 1972:** I indicated to Malcolm Tinsley, Regional Personnel Manager of M&I Prairie Region in Winnipeg my interest in filling one of the Prairie Region positions becoming vacant as a result of impending retirements, including that of Officer-in-Charge, CIC Emerson. In reply, D.J. Terenne, Chief of Staffing, M&I Prairie Region stated that opportunities for border and inland staff in the

Prairies were limited and staffing policy restricted competitions to employees within the Region.

**March 28, 1972:** Prepared a letter for the signature of Zavie Levine, Special Assistant to the Minister, which stated Canada's position regarding Southern Rhodesian passports: "As a result of a resolution passed in 1968 in the United Nations ... it is Canadian government policy not to admit any person into this country who travels on a Southern Rhodesian passport."

**April 6, 1972:** Frank Murphy had a private talk with me, warning that the word was that I was stubborn and argumentative and this may affect my future adversely. There had been comments on my critical report on the Kemptville management training course. I told Frank I felt I was doing clerical work at IDHQ with little responsibility at the PM3 level. What was the purpose of the course, I asked, if staff were not allowed to apply its principles? I was trying to achieve for desk officers the level of responsibility described in the written duties of our positions where we might work under "general direction" rather than under supervision. Our Position Analysis Schedule (PAS) of April 1, 1971 indicated that we worked under "general direction" to "identify, resolve and advise on unusual and difficult immigration cases related to the control and entry of non-immigrants". Frank suggested my approach was too blunt. Of course, he was correct. I was too independent-minded, not realistic enough. The PAS was designed to upgrade IDHQ positions, not to give more authority to desk officers. Frank gave me excellent advice that I failed to follow. Being rebellious, I had great difficulty adapting to the IDHQ culture. I didn't learn Frank's lesson until I returned to the immigration service in 1999, five years after my first retirement in 1994.

**May 1972:** A time and work study was conducted at IDHQ. Officers were required to report statistics on the time and action taken on each case. In a world without personal computers, a typing pool transcribed letters and memoranda recorded by officers on a Dictaphone. It was not uncommon to have documents rewritten half a dozen times for a word change. Some of the work completed during this study in the Non-Immigrant Entries Unit gives a flavour of the effort:

(1) read Thunder Bay complaint report made by one client and refer matter to R.G. Latimer (Minister's Administrative Assistant); (2) request for

admission by an A5(d) (criminal) deport referred to Director of Immigration in Halifax; (3) read field report and drafted written reply to M.P. concerning nomination of in-law in Canada; (4) review A5(d) waiver request, prepared written recommendation for approval in principle; (5) prepared written reply to T.C. Douglas re NI extension request by constituent's visiting relative.

**June 2, 1972:** The Director of the Asia Division of CIDA objected to the application for landing of a student from Sarawak. CIDA argued the student was obliged to return to his home country after concluding his studies in Canada. The Colombo Plan trainee signed a nomination form in 1964 which was endorsed by an official of the Sarawak government. However, the student repaid the monies loaned to him by the Sarawak government and was released from the obligation to return to his home country. No evidence existed that the student signed a separate agreement with the Canadian government or was otherwise ineligible to apply for landing in Canada. CIDA later withdrew its objection to the student's application for landing.

**June 9, 1972:** Results of PM4 competition. I was advised by M.W. Reteff, Staffing Officer, HQ Personnel Services that I was one of five officers who qualified in the PM 4 Appeals Officer competition.

**June 16, 1972:** I met for the first time with members of IDHQ's Appeals Unit, including Tom Gill the senior appeals officer, Gil Labelle, Art Vass, Bill Bernhardt, Marius Parent and Ray Madore. The unit had been recently transformed from the Appeals Division within Enforcement Branch to the Appeals Task Force (ATF), reporting directly to the HSB Director. As Tom Gill explained, with this change the primary role of the Appeals Task Force would be to "to assist the court and to represent the Minister as he would wish to be represented before the Immigration Appeal Board (IAB). No officer will take a case before the Board unless it is defensible. If the case is indefensible or the officer has reservations about our position before the Board, he should dictate a memo, attach it on file, and send it to the Senior Appeals Officer for review. Officers should look at cases not from the point of view of how to defend the deportation order but what is right and proper in the circumstances, consistent with the requirements of the Act and the

Department's overall objectives. Officers must administer the Act with sympathetic understanding."

**In June 1972:** the Minister announced that some 10,000 cases were backlogged before the IAB.

**July 1, 1972:** I began my new job in the Appeals Unit at the PM4 level. My mentors, Steve Wise and Bill Bernhardt, gradually trained me in the unit's work. For almost two months I prepared written submissions to the IAB and then attended hearings with an experienced Appeals Officer. Finally, in September, I went before the IAB on my own. Our Ottawa Unit was responsible for IAB appeals filed in Western and Atlantic Canada. The units in Toronto and Montreal dealt exclusively with the cases in Ontario and Quebec.

**August 1972:** Tom Gill assigned me as one of three new Appeals Officers handling applications for release from detention and preparing, signing and dispatching written submissions without reference to him. A "regular officer will accompany the new officers to the IAB to provide guidance and instill confidence." Harry Langston arrived from Montreal in September 1972 to assume the duties of Senior Appeals Officer.

**August 29, 1972:** Minister Bryce Mackasey visited Toronto Airport and addressed immigration staff, discussing new legislation to close some loopholes that was to be tabled at the next session of Parliament. The appeals procedures, he said, were too complex and because of delays, were open to abuse. As well, he was concerned about the exploitation of immigrants by private consultants. Finally, he stated: "...you as Immigration Officers must be people oriented not only in the application of the selection criteria, but in the area of enforcement of the Immigration Act and regulations" and emphasized that an Immigration Officer [must be] "something more than a nincompoop standing at a dull airport Immigration office in a drab uniform." A concern was unjust criticism by the press of under-classified and overworked airport officers. In order to forestall this phenomenon, an early warning control centre in Ottawa, headed by Jack Cardwell, was set up. As well, ports of entry officer classifications (then at the CR 5 and 6 levels) were reviewed, with a view to upgrading them and plans were being developed for new uniforms – "a contemporary blazer and slacks style to reflect the true spirit and feeling of Canada."

**September 18, 1972:** J.E. McKenna, HSB Director, met with employees to hear their views and to address a number of issues. In his address, McKenna emphasized that the Appeals Officer represents the Minister and can enter an appeal against the decision of the SIO and can argue against an SIO decision. Therefore, Appeals Officers in consultation with their supervisors should take an independent approach, even arguing that appeals be allowed. However, the new procedural instructions written by The Chief of the ATF appeared to be inconsistent with the spirit of the McKenna's address, favouring a more restrictive approach.

A number of other important issues mentioned in McKenna's September 1972 address:

- Because of backlogs, the 60-day processing objective on current cases announced by the Minister in late June would have to be extended to 90 days.
- Advertisements were circulating abroad that prospective immigrants should come to Canada before expected legislative changes. Approximately 40,000 NIALs were being landed in Canada each year and it was not expected the amount would fluctuate greatly.
- Because of limited staff resources to handle the workload, dealing with appeals cases had to be slowed down. This would allow many NIALs to get established in employment and become landed.
- IDHQ had to be more decisive and assertive in dealing with the field, giving specific orders especially when dealing with the arrest of dangerous persons.
- New immigration legislation was being drafted: eventually, the 1976 Immigration Act was born.
- The four-day week and staggered hours would depend on the production level being maintained.
- While there were possibly 50,000 illegal aliens in Canada, the Government was not too concerned about this problem.
- McKenna indicated he did not wish to encourage participative management processes and was not sure management by objectives was beneficial in motivating employees.

**October 9, 1972:** Refining ATF procedures. The ATF Chief wrote the following instructions: "In the absence of instructions on file, an Appeals Officer will seek the dismissal of the appeal and the

deportation of the individual concerned. When it appears there is a valid reason why a request to the Board for deportation would not be a just or proper one, the Appeals Officer will submit his views and recommendations to the Senior Appeals Officer who may exercise his discretion and change the original instructions on file." (Note that this was often impractical, especially when the Appeals Officer was in the middle of a hearing before the IAB). The instructions continued: "Under no circumstances will any officer act contrary to established departmental policy or procedures unless he has specific written instructions to do so." Most Appeals Officers believed that given the tone and wording of the new instructions, discretion was not intended to be a real option.

#### **Disagreements with the ATF Chief:**

As union representative, I had disagreements with the Chief regarding overtime and time-off procedures. I further upset the ATF Chief by refusing to take a case before the IAB because of an alleged injustice to the appellant, involving the Department's administrative failure to allow the appellant, an immigrant applicant for landing in Canada, to leave Canada voluntarily when she failed to meet selection criteria. After being incorrectly assessed and two unsuccessful Motions before the IAB, the appellant's lawyer asked the Federal Court to review the matter. The ATF Chief had asked the lawyer to withdraw the Federal Court action with a promise that the Department would not oppose a third motion before the IAB to "reopen, reconsider and rehear the appeal" for the purpose of recommending that the woman be landed. The lawyer followed this advice, withdrew his motion before the Federal Court and again put forward a motion to the IAB. The ATF Chief then asked me to handle the case before the IAB. However, I was given instructions to argue against any positive outcome, contrary to the promise made to the woman's lawyer. I refused, stating that if the IAB challenged me on a number of questions, I could find no convincing arguments to support the Department's position, especially given the ATF Chief's commitment to the appellant's lawyer. The ATF Chief appointed another Appeals Officer to handle the case, the Chief acting as counsel.

#### **November 20-24, 1972:**

Temporary assignment with the Appeals Unit in Toronto: Cases were processed before the IAB with

little preparation, in a factory, assembly-line fashion, one after another.

During a visit to Winnipeg in December 1972, I met with Ray Corbett, Director of Immigration Operations for the Prairies about a possible transfer to Winnipeg. Ray advised he had a PM2 position for me as an immigration counsellor in Calgary. This would bring me back to the Prairie Region and enable me to compete on regional competitions to return eventually to Winnipeg. I had written twice in October to the M&I Chief of Staffing in Winnipeg indicating a willingness to transfer to a position in the Prairie Region, even at the cost of a demotion. I was not coping well in the Department's politically-sensitive Ottawa environment. While challenging, the work before the IAB had become routine and predictable. I resented what I perceived as the increased, micro-managed control of my work and felt I was living in a paradox, where a retrograde government administration competed against the modern management principles promoted in Kemptville. I was not always a team player and not always on the same page as my superiors. I was too independent minded for my own good. As Frank Murphy correctly assessed in April, I was too stubborn and argumentative and had not yet learned to hold my tongue or my pen diplomatically.

**Gary moved on...***With my daughter 2 and 1/2 years old, our family needed to return to Winnipeg so she could spend time with her grandparents. My wife was also anxious to go 'home'. Also, I wanted to continue my studies at the University of Manitoba and to return to field work. The transfer request to the staffing chief in Winnipeg began a two decade roller-coaster career ride from a PM4 Appeals Officer in Ottawa, to a PM2 immigration counsellor in Calgary in 1973; PM3 Special Inquiry Officer, Winnipeg, 1974; PM1 port of entry immigration examining officer Winnipeg Airport, 1976; PM3 Case Presenting Officer, 1978; PM4 and 5 Acting and Chief of Enforcement and Intelligence, Manitoba Region, 1980-1984; PM4 Chief of Settlement, Manitoba Region, 1985; and finally, PM1 Port of Entry Officer again at the Winnipeg Airport from 1986 to 1993. As a voluntary condition of pre-retirement employment, I completed my immigration career as a Special Assistant to the Manitoba Director of Immigration in 1993-1994 at the PM1 level, refused a higher grade, and then retired for the first of four times. I refused an offer in*

*1994 to stay on as the Prairie Region's PM4 Intelligence Chief.*

*Five years later, still addicted to immigration work. I jumped back and forth in term and contract conditions every few months from 1999 to 2004 as a Hearings Officer, first doing routine cases before an Adjudicator for two years while mentoring Department of Justice lawyers. Then I was responsible for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity issues for the Prairie Region until 2004. The Public Service Commission refused to approve any further extensions of my time, insisting the department hire someone permanently for the position. In 2004-2005 I traveled to the Abu Dhabi Emirate as a consultant, restructuring that country's immigration system. And finally I spent two out of my depth months in 2007 as a white-haired, 66 year old, limping arthritic immigration instructor, in uniform (complete with yellow shoulder patch bars) at the college in Rigaud. I use the word "instructor" in the loosest sense of the term for I truly knew little of the amended immigration laws or what I was doing.*

### **Chief Players in Gary John Komar's 1972 Memoir**

Minister of Manpower and Immigration: Bryce Mackasey (1921-1999); Mackasey replaced Otto Lang

Special Assistant to the Minister: Zavie Levine

Minister's Administrative Assistant: R.G. Latimer (1931-2009)

ADM Immigration: Dr. R. M. Adams

ADM Operations: Cal Best (1926-2007)

Director Manpower Training: John Lawrence Manion (1931-2010)

Home Service Branch (HSB) Director: J.E. McKenna

Home Services Branch (HSB) Coordinator: Art Lepitre (deceased)

Bob Latimer

John St. Onge

Immigration Appeals Board (IAB) Ottawa

Chairman – J.C.A. Campbell and Mrs. Scott

Members – Houle, Legare, Byrne, Glogowski

IAB Toronto:

Members -A.B. Weselak, U. Benedetti and Byrne

## IDHQ:

### Non Immigrant Entries Unit, Admissions Division, Home Services Branch (HSB).

Director: Frank Murphy

#### Non Immigrant Section

Manager: Ernie White

Larry Gafenco

Gus Leonard

Gary Komar

### PM-4 Appeals Officer Promotion Board

John St. Onge, chair of promotion board

M.W. Reteff, Staffing Officer, HQ Personnel  
Services

Successful candidates for promotion:

K. Bufe

Marius D. Parent (deceased)

G.J. Komar

Al A. Kirney (died January 2004)

D.P. Hall

Gary Komar

### IDHQ Appeals Unit (Appeals Task Force):

Tom Gill, Senior Appeals Officer (deceased)

Harry Langston, Senior Appeals Officer

Gil Labelle, Appeals Officer (deceased)

Art Vass, Appeals Officer (deceased)

Bill Bernhardt, Appeals Officer

Marius Parent, Appeals Officer (deceased)

Ray Madore, Appeals Officer (deceased)

Steve Wise, Appeals Officer

Al Kirney, Appeals Officer

Gary Komar, Appeals Officer

Brenda Nellis, Appeals Clerk

### Early Warning Control Centre

Jack Cardwell: Head

### Policy and Procedures Unit

Charlie Dagg: Head (1919-2008)

### Admissions Division

Dalt Collins: Chief

Maude Manners: Secretary

### Security Review Section (Admissions Division, HSB)

Charlie Hill: Chief

Ross Booth

Gerry King

## M&I Union

Lionel Dixon, national president

### IDHQ M&I Union Local

Presidents of Local Branch: Gary Komar,  
then Lionel Dixon,

Betty Roff, Vice President

Harry Donner, Treasurer

National Executive member: Al Gunn (1922-2009)

### Local Branch Executive members at large:

Lionel Dixon

Freda Greenlees (deceased)

Betty Roff V

Velma Pratt (deceased)

Gary Komar

Fern Corriveau

Tom Mascaro

### Twenty-Five year Service Pins awarded in 1972 by

Dr. R.M. Adams, Assistant Deputy Minister –

#### Immigration to:

Ernie White

Tony Werbin

Al Findlay

Gerry King

W.D. Gruer

Al Gorman

Bert Carkner

Art McDonald

Attended: Dalt Collins, Chief, Admissions Division  
(deceased), Art Lepitre (deceased)

Ray Corbett, Director of Immigration Operations,  
Prairie Region

J.E. (Ted) Fleming, Dave Darby and Bob Wick from  
Prairie Region

G.H. Thomas, W.H. Shaw and R.E. Milton attended  
from the Atlantic Region

J.M. Bonneau, W.H. Henry and L. Fournier from  
Quebec Region

G.H. Jeffs, W. Maxwell and J.R. Mitchison from  
Ontario Region

F. Dann and F.W. Facey from the Pacific Region

### Prairie Region:

Ray Corbett, Director of Immigration Operations,  
Prairie Region

Malcom Tinsley, Regional Personnel Manager

Joe Ihme (d. 1978)

Bill Hill (1912-1995), Officer in Charge, CIC

Emerson

D.J. Terenne, Chief of Staffing, M&I Prairie Region



## Contact with Members - *Mike Molloy*

**L'agneau perdue:** The last time I gazed on the likeness of **Gilles Durocher**, I was in a photography shop in Beirut in the mid-1980s, and I noticed his picture among many others under the glass top of the shop's counter. My wife Jo has been on a relentless search for life members who have not been in touch, in some cases, for decades and Gilles was the last of what she called her lost lambs. The Society had been sending his Bulletin to France for years but, in going through some papers left by the late Al Gunn, I spotted a letter from Gilles stating he had moved back to Montreal quite some time ago. Undaunted, Jo tracked down every single Gilles Durocher in the Montreal area and left telephone messages. To my amazement and delight, Gilles recently returned her call. He returned to Canada after his wife passed way to be closer to his children. He reports he is in good health and enjoys reading the Bulletin. He was kind enough to provide contact addresses for a number of our retired colleagues living in Quebec whom we will be encouraging to join the Society. It was great to talk to you after so many years, Gilles, and I hope you will take up the opportunity to write some articles for us on your years in Immigration.

**Incidentally:** If you are in the process of downsizing and have been wondering what to do about that box full of old papers from your immigration career, think no more. Over the past year we have been able to generate one excellent article on the basis of old "stuff" donated by members and there are a number of additional features in preparation. So, before you put it out in the recycling box, please get in touch with us at [joandmikeca@yahoo.com](mailto:joandmikeca@yahoo.com) or 613 241 0166.

## "Tight Corner" by Roger White, Published by BPS Books, 2011 - *reviewed by Gerry Maffre*

With "Tight Corner", CIHS members can welcome the first novel of a former colleague in the immigration department. Roger White builds on both his experiences in journalism and in immigration communications at the Ontario RHQ and at NHQ, and on his interests in classic English autos to give us murder, intrigue and immigration scandal, set in the national capital.

The protagonist of "Tight Corner," Conn Anderson, worked in the immigration minister's office before leaving the public service to manage a vintage car garage. There, work on a Government-owned Ford Jaguar (an unusual vehicle in that fleet!) sets Conn to investigating the presumed suicide of his former minister's executive assistant. Conn learns of this death from the deputy minister who, uncharacteristically, stops by the garage to tell her former colleague and to ask that he not to speak to the media about the death. The case increasingly entangles Conn during the spring onslaught of tune-ups at the garage, providing White with an opportunity to "talk cars."

The mystery of the executive assistant's death deepens when his involvement with shadowy immigration consultants and a corrupt government official surfaces. As the assistant's role in a nationwide fraud becomes clearer, Conn's life comes under threat. And this, just as he and his landlady's niece are moving toward a relationship. Conn

pursues the fraud, with some police assistance, and discovers his former deputy minister's connection to the scandal.

Aptly subtitled "A Capital Crime," White's book features well-portrayed characters who are pulled into the 'Tight Corner' mystery in different but credible ways that also hint at their lives beyond this story. Is the author setting the scene for further books? While not focussing on government scandal, White realistically describes how it can engulf a government organization. He draws on his interest in vintage cars to work in dialogue about them, their mechanics and particularities and their owners, while grounding the story within its Ottawa setting.

In sum, we have an engaging mystery that nicely blends cars, murder and scandal into one book that helps motoring aficionados reflect back on a summer of driving and gives mystery buffs fall reading. There are twists and turns enough to satisfy either readership, and a use of dialogue that is appealing to all. A recommended addition to your library!

"Tight Corner" is available on-line through [www.bpsbooks.com](http://www.bpsbooks.com).

*Gerry and Roger worked together in the immigration programme's communications group many kilometres ago.*



## In Memoriam

### **Jean Patricia Sinclair**

We are sad to report the passing on June 11, 2011 of Jean Patricia Sinclair (nee Myers), wife of long time CIHS member William 'Bill' Sinclair. She worked as a secretary at Eastern Canada Savings and Loan in Halifax. Following her marriage she undertook a lifetime career with her husband in Canada's Foreign Service. They served in London, England; Hong Kong; Guyana and Surinam.

---